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The 1990 reforms and the alternative 
media in South Africa 
P Eric Loow and Keyan Tomaselli 
The alternative press, which contributed so much to the struggle against 
apartheid in the 1980s; found itseljunpreparedfor a new role in the freer 
media environment after the lifting of the State of Emergency in February 
1990. P Eric Louw and Keyan Tomaselli report on the financial, organisa-
tional and political difficulties now threatening the existence of the alter-
native press in South Africa. 
President F W de Klerk's Opening Ad-
dress to Parliament on 2 February 1990 
radically transformed South African 
(SA) politics. The government unbann-
ed the African National Congress 
(ANC), the Pan African Congress 
(PAC), and the SA Communist Party 
(SACP). It lifted the State of Emergen-
cy which had been in place since 1986. 
The government thus lifted the bulk of 
media censorship. For the alternative 
presses, De Klerk's actions should have 
signalled the beginning of a growth 
period in a much freer environment. Sad-
ly. however, these presses became victims 
of a fundamentally altered context for 
which they were largely ill- prepared. 
At the beginning of 1990, the ANC, 
largely through the work of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), had secured 
the largest constituency in the country, 
and alternative press support. Thus most 
analysts predicted that SA's political 
future would be ANC dominated. 
Though the National Party (NP) govern-
ment's public image had dramatically im-
proved both in SA and internationally, 
this Party had still to shake off the legacy 
of apartheid. The other players, both 
within and outside of Parliament, had 
neither the support nor the power of 
either the NP or ANC. 
During 1990, however, the political 
landscape was radically transformed by 
an extraordinary shake-down of the con-
tending parties. By mid-1991, De Klerk's 
reformed NP was the closest it had ever 
been to securing a workable formula for 
entrenching its 'white' constituency in 
power (albeit in a 'multi - racial' guise). 
In contrast, the ANC, despite the massive 
size of its support, had failed to organise 
either itself or its constituency. By 
mid-1991, the alternative press was in 
serious financial trouble as a result of the 
withdrawal of subsidies by foreign 
governments and churches. The NP also 
proved very skillful in outmanoeuvering 
the ANC by 'releasing' reform in stages. 
The political agenda thus remained under 
the control of the ruling hegemony which 
drew the liberal English language press 
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into its reformist political project. This 
was compounded by the ANC's inabili-
ty to effectively mobilise the issues which 
had driven the UDP to success in the 
previous decade. This ANC weakness 
translated into a NP strength. 
The 18 months following De Klerk's 
reform announcement saw the systematic 
weakening of the positions of both the 
ANC and its alternative press allies. How 
to organisationally integrate the ANC, 
MOM (Mass Democratic Movement) 
and SACP proved difficult. COSATU 
(Congress of South African Trade 
Unions), in particular, began to distance 
itself from the 'politicians'. Unionists 
argued that an independent labour move-
ment would serve its socialist aims more 
effectively than direct involvement in an 
ANC-dominated alliance. Further, UDF 
activists were often excluded from posi-
tions reserved for returning exiles in the 
new ANC structure internal to the coun-
try. This proved costly because the former 
exiles brought with them neither the 
constituency - building skills nor the in-
ternal support so painstakingly developed 
by UDF organisers between 1983 and 
1989. Not surprisingly then, the 1,600 
delegates (representing grassroots senti-
ment) at the ANC's December 1990 Con-
sultative Conference, expressed concern 
that the existing ANC leadership was 
'getting it wrong'. 
In the wake of the reforms, the ANC 
experienced enormous difficulties in 
developing mechanisms for com-
municating with, and organising its 
potential constituency, and for com-
municating to other constituencies. A 
number of factors gave rise to this. First, 
the ANC's constituency and the political 
structures failed to adjust from a 'libera-
tion struggle' to a new style of politics ap-
propriate to 'normal' and open political 
interaction. Further, sections of the 
ANC's constituency appeared to be 
beyond control. This was not only an 
ANC problem. Socially psychopathic 
groups and individuals crossing all races 
and political positions were bred by a 
decade of brutal civil war. Black 
townships, youth in particular, were 
highly radicalised, alienated from all 
authority, and prone to extreme elements 
within the military and police who 
wanted to sabotage reform, consistently 
undermined peace talks between the war-
ring factions{l}. 
A sad reflection on many alternative 
publications was their failure to critique 
the ANC's difficulty in adjusting to the 
post-reform era. Only the social 
democrat press, Weekly Mail and Vrye 
Weekblad, and left wing Work in Pro-
gress, tried to systematically tackle this 
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sensitive issue. 
Secondly, by losing the 'image game', 
through a refusal to speak to the political 
centre through tactical use of appropriate 
discourse and choice of media, the ANC 
lost much middle ground support. This 
support had been forged during the 1980s 
to a Congress position by UDP activists. 
The failure of the alternative and left 
commercial presses like South and New 
African to build up a large readership 
base by 1990 meant that it was unable to 
assist the ANC to reach an audience of 
major significance. The readers reached 
were, in any case, the 'already converted'. 
But eventually this was the only media 
the ANC could rely upon. This was 
because during the first year of its unban-
ning the Congress alienated whatever 
support it might have had within the 
mainstream liberal press through, 
amongst other things, erratic and often 
extremely poor press relations. The result 
was that most South Africans continued 
to see the world only through the 
mainstream press and/or state broad-
casting reports. To make matters worse, 
the mainstream press, through domestic 
and international news agencies, fed ' 
stories critical of the ANC to the overseas 
media. By squandering the image game 
at home, the ANC also lost credibility in 
the West. Since the alternative press, in 
turn, relied on Western funding to 
operate, the loss of prestige suffered by 
the Left only served to further curtail sur-
vival possibilities. 
. Thirdly, following the termination of 
funding by both the Western and Eastern 
blocs, the ANC experienced enormous 
problems funding its organisational pro-
grammes. This was a serious blow 
because none of the alternative papers 
had developed either effective manage-
ment skills or financial self-sufficiency. 
All had remained dependent on donor 
charity through worldwide opposition to 
apartheid. Further, the Church was also 
becoming less keen to fund 'alternatives' 
because it now saw apartheid as a policy 
of the past. Even the most viable of the 
alternatives, the Weekly Mail, ran into 
serious trouble because of the ill- fated 
attempt to launch the Daily Mail in 
mid-1990(2J. Only UmAfrika, whose 
financial position had improved 
dramatically by 1990, and whose raison 
d'etre was not solely political, seemed set 
to survive the epoch of the 80s. 
The threat of funding being cut off, 
plus the government's outmanoeuvering 
the ANC, produced sufficient 
demoralisation' in 'alternative 
newsrooms' to cause some attrition in 
staff. Ultimately, it seems the alternative 
press was a 1980s phenomenon. It was a 
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press born of the popular (UDF) phase 
of the struggle against apartheid. It serv-
ed this struggle well, but ironically the 
. success of this struggle brought about a 
reformed South Africa that no longer ap-
peared to have a place for the alternative 
press. Its effective time ran from the birth 
of Cape Town's Grassroots in 1980 to De 
Klerk's February 1990 speech. Once real 
fundamental reform was set in motion, 
the raison d'elre of the alternative press 
was effectively curtailed. De Klerk's 
February 1991 Opening Address to 
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Parliament simply confirmed the fact 
that the end of an era had been reached. 
Max du Preez, editor of the Vrye 
Weekblad, summed up the 'demise' of 
this press genre during an SABC inter-
view dealing with the transformation of 
Vrye Weeklblad from an Afrikaans alter-
native newspaper into a bilingual 
magazine. He said: 'It is yesterday's cause 
to be an alternative newspaper' .• 
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Vatican launches information service 
The Vatican has launched its own news 
service, the Vatican Information Service 
(VIS). Subscribers to VIS can call up in-
formation by computer or have it faxed 
to them. The daily three-page news 
bulletin is produced in English and 
Spanish '-and further translations are 
planned. 
VIS lists the people who have had an 
audience with the Pope, the names of new 
bishops, and summaries of papal ad-
dresses. 
Officially introduced on 25 May 1991, 
rumours had been circulating about the 
new service for months. 
There is much speculation about why 
the Vatican has introduced the new ser-
vice. One reason given is that the Vatican 
wishes to transmit up to date, reliable in-
formation on papal addresses and ac-
tivities to bishops throughout the world, 
not only to keep them informed, but to 
help them react critically and effectively 
to local press reports on the Vatican. Not 
every bishop can listen to Radio Vatican 
and the Osservatore Romano is only 
delivered days after publication to 
Mozambique or the Fiji Islands. 
VIS comes onto the market at a time 
when Vatican. prelates are becoming in-
creasingly annoyed at the aspects of 
papal speeches picked up by both the 
Italian and foreign media. 
But however strong their faith and 
loyalty to the Church, VIS editors have 
the same problems in seeking objectivi-
ty as their colleagues outside the Vatican: 
they also have to choose what to focus 
on and how to organise it into a short, 
comprehensible and correct article. 
In end effect, VIS is a Vatican PR 
mouthpiece and is not likely to replace 
the work of secular or Church media. 
VIS director is Vatican press spokesman 
Joaquin Navarro-Valls. The office 
manager is Italian/Argentinian Pietro 
Vrunori, who is assisted by two editors: 
Fernando Monge Sanchez for Spanish 
and Joan Lewis for English. 
Based on KNA report 
